an interesting connundrum

[emprworm]

I was thinking the other day about the star trek transporter.

[nemafakei]

Well, if, as I do, you define a person by the character arising from their material composition (including memories, behaviour, etc.) then yes, it would be you. Along with as many clones as you forgot to annihilate, if you're going to continue with the rest of the standard philosophical problem.

[GUNWOUNDS]

I was thinking the other day about the star trek transporter.

[emprworm]

well here is a question:

once you knew with 100% certainty that the apparatus worked flawlessly-  would you step into the tube?

would you make a difference between the local teleporter (where the same atoms are used to reconstruct you) with the remote one?

[nemafakei]

Happy to do so for either, if the teleporters were in of themslves an efficient use of energy (and there's no chance of the data being stored, or clones created... that could cause complications).

[GUNWOUNDS]

well here is a question:

once you knew with 100% certainty that the apparatus worked flawlessly-

[Cyborg]

No, but you don't just "destroy" you to keep a clone from running around.

You'd need to analyze the atoms in the object anyway.

And the system would be limited to transport by speed of light.

I believe you'd be yourself, think as you did before, and so on and so forth.

[ordos45]

There was an Outer Limits episode on this called "Think Like A Lizard" where they made the mistake.  It was quite the psychological drama...as for me, I'm unsure what to think.

[EWS]

The question isn't really whether you are your self, it is whether you fell yourself.  You could share all the same physicial properties but you may feel different.  Dirty almost.

[GUNWOUNDS]

if you get amnesia and forget everything about yourself .... are you the same person?... i do not think so

i believe that you are your memories.... not your body...

and the machine could replicate your body... but not your memories.

[emprworm]

well consider this scenario:

you step into the tube.  the computer records your data.  10 seconds later, you step out of the same tube.

the scientists tells you "I apologize for not injecting the antimatter and destroying you.  we were doing an experiment.  There is an exact copy of you walking out of the remote location now."

does this not prove that you are indeed not the same person?

[Vanguard3000]

This is an very old philosophical "conundrum" as you put it.  Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) among others asked the question what constitutes personal identity.

It is known that a human being will completely renew his cells every seven years.  That is, in seven years time, all of the cells in the body will have died, leaving an entirely new physical body.  So the question is:  If the Julius Caesar who existed seven years after the crossing of the Rubicon the same person as he who made the crossing itself?  Physically, no.  But does that mean he is a totally different person?

The brain is firing electrical impulses... and there is an uncertainty principle... says that you can never predict where an electron is or where it will go...

Well, the brain stores memory in chemical form as well, so although you may not remember exactly what you were thinking at the time, you'd still have memory.

And the way I see it, I'd still be myself as long as I still had all my memories and gestalt mind (which is odd, since normally I'm much more sentimental than that).  But of course, how would I know if I didn't?

[Wolf]

Would any difference matter? Human beings constantly exchange the atoms in themselves for the atoms in the outside world, but only at a very slow rate. In ten years from now, the atoms that are used to compose me are not the same as the ones I have while I type this post. Therefore, yes, there would be a difference, but it would not matter. It is really you, because you are still you ten years from now when all atoms have been naturally exchanged for others.

[nemafakei]

"does this not prove that you are indeed not the same person?"

Why? The person on the other end is being told and feels the same thing, but just happens to be in a different location.

As to Gunwounds question of practicality, it's impossible and going to remain so for a long time to overcome the Heisenberg principle - you cannot simultanoeusly know a particle's location and its direction.

[Cyborg]

if you get amnesia and forget everything about yourself .... are you the same person?... i do not think so

i believe that you are your memories.... not your body...

and the machine could replicate your body... but not your memories.

If it was to be used, then it actually would have replicated your memories too...

[Anathema]

I wouldn't be surprised if most of my friends don't know what a transporter is, but they're not visiting this site :)

Flooding the first pod with enough anti matter to destroy the original would obliberate an entire continent. That aside, it's also murder, regardless of the fact that you're creating a copy of the victim.

About the copy, it's not you technicly, but it can't be proven.

[Cyborg]

I wouldn't be surprised if most of my friends don't know what a transporter is, but they're not visiting this site :)

Flooding the first pod with enough anti matter to destroy the original would obliberate an entire continent. That aside, it's also murder, regardless of the fact that you're creating a copy of the victim.

About the copy, it's not you technicly, but it can't be proven.

Not antimatter...

He'd be de-assembled, and the atoms should be kept so that people could return... Or else it'd be a one way trip. Ever thought of that?

And the atoms would need to be analyzed. What better time than during the de-assembly?

[emprworm]

"does this not prove that you are indeed not the same person?"

Why? The person on the other end is being told and feels the same thing, but just happens to be in a different location.

As to Gunwounds question of practicality, it's impossible and going to remain so for a long time to overcome the Heisenberg principle - you cannot simultanoeusly know a particle's location and its direction.

because you begin with 1 being, and end up with two.  obviously two beings is not the same as one.

[DukeLeto]

well here is a question:

once you knew with 100% certainty that the apparatus worked flawlessly-  would you step into the tube?

would you make a difference between the local teleporter (where the same atoms are used to reconstruct you) with the remote one?

1. Yes, I would use the device.

2. No, I would not make a distinction between the two, aside from the second method (same structure, new matter) being more practical for long-range use.

[shygirl4]

American scientists have already succesfully beamed somthing from one pod to another.

http://www.dune2k.com/forum/index.php?topic=12217.0#msg204247

Shy  ::)

[SurlyPIG]

Interesting topic.  I'll have a go.

Of course, ten seconds later you walk out of the remote tube, completely whole and with all your memories, feelings, thoughts in tact.

but is it really you?

The most obvious question this rasies is how do yo define "you?"  How do you define identity?

I think that the individual is changed from moment to moment whether it is internal or a reaction to their environment, even if the changes are miniscule.  A person at age eight is very different from that same person at age eighty.  Also, a person changes in a month, a week, a day, an hour, whatever.  Though the differences at this time would be indescernable, it's difficult to argue that seconds can't make a difference.  For example, you're walking with your significant other, go to cross a street, and are hit by a car and they are killed.  A second or two later could have made the difference between a traumatic, life-altering event, and running along to do whatever it is you were doing before the would-be accident.

Thus, when one person is copied to the other end, for a moment, you would have two of exactly the same person.  The differences in the new individual would become discernable when the copy either noticed or was told that it was the copy, otherwise it would be standing in tube #2 in the remote laboratory thinking "gee I hope this antimatter doesn't hurt." (reminds me of the movie multiplicity; the clone doesn't know he's a clone and even denies that he's the clone until the doc shows him the little #2 he wrote on the clone's ear)

For this reason, I would not use the device.  Even though an exact copy of me appears at the other end, oblivious of the fact that it is the copy, I, the individual, would still be destroyed by the antimatter.  I see no logical problem with there being two identical individuals for in the moment that the two exist.  I wouldn't want a clone, and I wouldn't want to be replaced by someone, even if my clone is momentarily the same as me because I know that once my clone realises that he is the clone, he will cease being the same person.  It is arguable that I would be a different person for each different method of transportation to the remote lab, whether it was by "streamlined" atoms, destruction/reconstruction, car, jet, taxi, walking, bus etc. as those are all different components, and as proven earlier, seemingly insignificant differences can be life-altering.  But I still wouldn't use the device because I don't like the idea of being cloned and destroyed.  I know that the second I step out of that pod #2 and see that I'm the clone, I won't be able to think about anything other than the other me that had a close encounter with some antimatter, and that would weigh on my mind and alter my psyche in an undesireable way.

[nemafakei]

"because you begin with 1 being, and end up with two.  obviously two beings is not the same as one"

The two of you is not the same as one of you. But each one reacts and behaves just as the original would have done.

[EWS]

Heisenberg principle

Well just do what Star Trek has and create an anti-Heisenberg relay.  ;D ;D

Anyway, as for having two people with the same "stuff" [nice technical stuff there) neither would be you.  You could not be sure which one was meant to be the "real" you and so all they would be is machines with the same memories and with the same characteristics.  But think of the fun you could have!

[emprworm]

well in my opinion, i look at the problem as follows:

the anti-matter injection is a red herring and irrelevant to the question at hand.

Consider two protons A & B, both identical in properties.

we know, using the law of noncontradiction, that A cannot be both A and non-A simultaneously.  They are completely seperate entities.

Now, we can use these particles, along with electrons and neutrons, to make two identical bricks.  The bricks are seperate entities, the fact they are identical does not cause them to become "one" entity.

Extend this to a human. 

Assume you are asleep.  When you wake up, you see an exact clone sleeping beside you, to your shock.  A metal probe is attached to your skull, and one in his skull. 

A scientist says "We successfully copied you.  Same memories, same feelings.  Every thought you are currently having, is being written into his conscious.  Now, to complete the process we need to kill you so that your clone can be your new copy.  Once you are dead, the clone will awake and become you."

Obviously, this is the end of your life, and the start of someone else's.

this is my opinion on the matter.  there is no way i would step into that teleporter.  doing so means suicide.

[GUNWOUNDS]

the only way a clone could be "you" is if you both shared a telepathic link.... where you could feel , smell, see,